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Abstract
The ability to mentalize has been marked as an important cognitive mechanism enabling
belief in supernatural agents. In five studies we cross-culturally investigated the relationship
between mentalizing and belief in supernatural agents with large sample sizes (over 67,000
participants in total) and different operationalizations of mentalizing. The relative importance
of mentalizing for endorsing supernatural beliefs was directly compared with credibility
enhancing displays–the extent to which people observed credible religious acts during their
upbringing. We also compared autistic with neurotypical adolescents. The empathy quotient
and the autism-spectrum quotient were not predictive of belief in supernatural agents in
all countries (i.e., The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States), although we did
observe a curvilinear effect in the United States. We further observed a strong influence of
credibility enhancing displays on belief in supernatural agents. These findings highlight the
importance of cultural learning for acquiring supernatural beliefs and ask for reconsidera-
tions of the importance of mentalizing.
Introduction
According to conservative estimates, at least 80% of the world population believes in inten-
tional supernatural agents [1]. In this context, we refer to supernatural agents as an umbrella
term for all intentional agents not conforming to a naturalistic worldview. Given this impres-
sive number, the question arises what underlies this apparently universal human tendency to
believe in intentional supernatural agents. One suggestion is that these beliefs emerge as by-
products of normal evolved cognitive mechanisms, such as dualistic reasoning[2]. This sugges-
tion is well established in the cognitive science of religion [3].
One of the key cognitive mechanisms hypothesized to underlie supernatural beliefs is the
ability to mentalize or to engage in theory of mind (ToM) reasoning [2,4–17]. This is the abil-
ity to attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires to other minds [18,19]. The logic underlying this
hypothesis is that in order for people to be able to believe in intentional supernatural agents,
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they should at least have the mentalizing abilities required to conceptualize the agent’s inten-
tions [8,17]. Specifically, the idea is that an evolved cognitive mechanism for inferring
intentionality of human agents is similarly activated when inferring the intentionality of super-
natural agents. In the current study, we aimed to investigate whether mentalizing abilities are
indeed important for supporting belief in supernatural agents, by investigating whether indi-
vidual differences in mentalizing covary with degrees of belief. Also, we placed the relative
importance of mentalizing in context by comparing it to the importance of credibility enhanc-
ing displays–the extent to which people observed credible religious acts during their upbring-
ing [20–22].
In the existing literature, the relationship between mentalizing and belief in supernatural
beliefs has been investigated in different ways. In one line of studies, researchers used the
(shortened) Empathy Quotient [23,24], because mentalizing was argued to be important to
empathy [16,17,25]. The link between the EQ and supernatural beliefs was found to be statisti-
cally significant, but modest (i.e., all r’s< .22). However, the EQ did not predict supernatural
beliefs when variables such as analytic thinking or moral concern were taken into account
[26]. Moreover, the psychometric validity of the scale has been critiqued, as the scale does not
correlate to mentalizing ability tasks [27]. As a result, the EQ cannot be considered to unequiv-
ocally assess mentalizing. In other studies, taking into account a wider variety of operationali-
zations of mentalizing such as the reading the mind in the eye test and the perspective-taking
task, the authors reported inconsistent relationships between mentalizing and supernatural
beliefs [16,26]. The reading the mind in the eye test was significantly related to supernatural
beliefs in the study of Norenzayan et al. [16] but not in the study of Jack et al. [26]. In sum, at
most these studies demonstrated only a modest role for mentalizing underlying supernatural
beliefs.
Another line of studies linking mentalizing with supernatural beliefs comes from studies
focusing on people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) or on neurotypical people’s score at
measures of ASD such as the Autism Spectrum Quotient [8,10,15,16,28–30]. People with ASD
are thought to be characterized by difficulties conceptualizing intentions of others [18,31] and
ASD seems to have a strong genetic component [32]. In two studies, researchers found people
with ASD to have reduced supernatural beliefs compared to neurotypical people [16,33], but
other researchers did not find such a relationship [34–36]. Moreover, anecdotal reports show
that people with ASD can believe in supernatural agents [8,37–39] although they may endorse
a more negative view of God [40]. In short, investigations into the relationship between ASD
and supernatural beliefs have yielded mixed results.
In a final line of studies linking mentalizing to supernatural beliefs, researchers have linked
brain areas associated with ToM (i.e., the so-called ToM-network) to supernatural beliefs and
behaviors in neuroimaging studies [41]. The ToM-network is a network of functionally related
brain regions that are steadily activated in association with tasks related to mentalizing [42],
such as Heider and Simmel’s [43] classical Geometrical Figures Task (GFT). In this task, geo-
metrical figures move as if they have intentions. The ToM-network encompasses the medial
prefrontal cortex, the anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, the precuneus, and the bilateral
temporal parietal junction [44–46]. In a study in which religious believers silently prayed to
God, the ToM-network was found to be activated, whereas this was less the case when they
thought of the Lord’s Prayer, made wishes to Santa Claus or thought of a nursery rhyme [47].
This finding suggests that personal contact with a supernatural agent involves ToM-related
processing and this finding has been replicated and extended with a control condition in
which participants imaginatively spoke to a loved one [48]. In a similar fashion, the ToM-net-
work was activated when believers thought about God’s mental states [49] or God’s beliefs
[50]. Finally, brain regions of the ToM-network were activated more strongly in supernatural
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believers than skeptics when randomly moving geometrical figures were shown [51]. Impor-
tantly, in this study the intensity of the activation in the ToM-network correlated with the
intentionality ratings of the participants. Taken together, these neuroimaging studies seem to
converge with the idea that naturally evolved brain mechanisms for ToM-reasoning are simi-
larly activated when perceiving intentionality or when thinking about supernatural agents.
Nevertheless, it is premature to conclude that mentalizing is an important cognitive mecha-
nism enabling belief in supernatural agents, merely on the basis of these neuroimaging studies.
Crucially, in these studies it is assumed that when the brain areas associated with the ToM-net-
work are activated with a certain task this means that the underlying process (i.e., mentalizing)
is active but this is not necessarily the case [36].
In short, the literature so far does not provide clear-cut evidence that mentalizing abilities
are indeed a driving factor behind supernatural beliefs. Thus, to shed further light on this on-
going debate, we extended earlier work in four important ways. First and foremost, in studies
2, 4 and 5, we compared the relative importance of mentalizing skills (as measured in the same
way as previous researchers who observed effects of mentalizing) for predicting supernatural
beliefs with a specific cultural learning theory on how supernatural beliefs are acquired [20–
22]. According to some researchers, the role of culture in acquiring supernatural beliefs is sec-
ondary to primary intuitive cognitive biases [6]. Others acknowledge a strong reciprocal influ-
ence between cognitive biases and cultural factors [12,52]. However, there is a recent trend of
researchers emphasizing the importance of cultural learning factors—they consider cognitive
mechanisms to be secondary to cultural foundations of supernatural beliefs [20–22,53], with
some even asking for a revision of the by-product framework [54]. Thus, to account for the
current debate, we directly compared the relative importance of individual differences in men-
talizing and exposure to credible religious displays during upbringing for predicting supernat-
ural beliefs, and to our knowledge, we are the first to do so.
The theory of credibility enhancing displays (i.e., CREDs) is a cultural learning theory with
a substantial explanatory potential. Henrich [20] and Lanman [21] have proposed that the
extent to which people become supernatural believers is largely determined by the degree to
which they have been exposed to credible displays of belief in the supernatural. For example, if
parents or caretakers say they believe in God, pray every night before dinner and go to church
every weekend, these are considered very credible displays of the existence of a supernatural
realm. On the one hand, when CREDs of religiosity are observed, the likelihood is increased
that observes take over supernatural beliefs expressed by actors. On the other hand, when
CREDs of atheism or unreliable religious acts (e.g., highly unmoral religious actors) are
observed, the likelihood is decreased that the observer acquires supernatural beliefs. Thus,
CREDs provide a comprehensive explanation for both theism and atheism. Supportive data
for the theory of CREDs have been presented [22,54], but a direct comparison with cognitive
biases is missing.
A second way in which our study extends previous work on the relationship between men-
talizing and belief is that large sample sizes were employed (Study 1–study 4) with over 67,000
participants in total. Therefore, we have strong foundations to draw conclusions from. A third
way in which our study extends earlier work is that we made use of both self-report question-
naires (i.e., the EQ, AQ and hyper-systemizing, in order to directly compare our results with
previous studies on this topic) as well as an experimental test used in neuroimaging studies to
localize brain areas involved with ToM processing (i.e., the Geometrical Figures Task; in Study
4 and Study 5). Thereby, we increased the likelihood that we tapped into the concept of menta-
lizing more thoroughly than in most previous studies. Finally, we investigated samples from
three different countries (i.e., The Netherlands [Study 1, Study 2 and Study 5], Switzerland
[Study 3] and The United States of America [Study 4]) varying in the extent to which they are
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
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religious (i.e., secularized: With secularization we refer to the societal decline in level of religi-
osity), thereby improving the generalizability of our findings.
Overview of the studies
As outlined above, we present five studies in which we cross-culturally investigated the rela-
tionship between mentalizing and supernatural beliefs in three countries varying in the extent
to which they are secularized. We tested large samples, used different operationalizations of
mentalizing and compared the relative importance of mentalizing to cultural learning (i.e.,
CREDs). We operationalized supernatural beliefs by several items indicative of religiosity (e.g.,
‘To what extent do you belief in God?’, ‘To what extent do you consider yourself religious?’),
hence we refer to this concept as ‘religiosity’. In Study 1, we investigated the relationship
between the AQ and religiosity in a large sample of participants from The Netherlands. In
Study 2, we added the EQ and CREDs for a similar Dutch sample. In Study 3, we investigated
the relationship between the AQ and religiosity in a less secularized country than The Nether-
lands (i.e., Switzerland). In Study 4, we investigated the relationship between the AQ, EQ, the
geometrical figures task (as a more objective way of measuring mentalizing abilities) and com-
pared the effects of these mechanisms in predicting religiosity to the role of CREDs in a pre-
registered study (https://osf.io/6vrne/) with US participants. In Study 5 we compared adoles-
cents from a Dutch high school specialized in ASD to adolescents from a regular high school.
In all studies, we hypothesized a relationship between mentalizing abilities and religiosity,
although we expected the relative influence of mentalizing abilities to be minimal compared to
influences of cultural learning. Summing up, we investigated the relative contribution of men-
talizing and CREDs on acquiring supernatural beliefs.
Study 1: The Netherlands 1
Materials and methods
Participants. In total, 99,516 participants started an online survey on the website of
‘Quest’, a popular Dutch Science magazine. Data were collected from the 8th of April 2014
until the 14th of January 2015. We excluded all participants who were younger than 18 years
old (12,688 participants) and those who did not fill out the entire survey (21,267 participants).
In total, 65,561 participants were used for further analyses. Participants (54.4% female) were
on average 29.5 years old (SD = 11.1; range 18–85 years). All studies were approved by the
ethical committee of the University of Amsterdam, confirmed to the laws applying to the
countries in which they were conducted and were conducted in accordance with the declara-
tion of Helsinki.
Procedure. On the website of Quest, participants were offered the opportunity to partici-
pate in an online survey (i.e., http://www.quest.nl/test/hoe-autistisch-ben-jij). The survey was
also featured in an article on autism in the paper version of the magazine–offering participants
the opportunity to get their personal score on the AQ. Before the survey started, participants
were provided with some background information on autism. Participants were cautioned
that the test was not an official diagnosis of autism, but rather an indication of their relative
score on the autism spectrum in relation to the general population. For an official diagnosis,
participants were referred to their general practitioner. The survey started with demographic
questions, followed by the autism-spectrum quotient (AQ) questionnaire and subsequently
participants received feedback about their scores. Participants were also given the option to
fill out the shortened post-critical belief scale (Duriez, Soenens, & Hutsebaut, 2005), which
was introduced by a short statement indicating that the researchers were interested in the
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
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relationship between autism and religious beliefs. The results of this questionnaire will be
reported elsewhere.
Demographics. Participants were asked to report their gender, age and level of education
(according to the Dutch educational system divided in 8 ordinal categories from no education
to University). In addition, four questions related to religiosity were included (‘To what extent
do you consider yourself religious?’, ‘How often do you visit a church, mosque or religious meet-
ing?’, ‘How often do you pray?’ and ‘To what extent do you belief in a God or a higher power?’)
and these were all measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all or never and 7 = very
much or very often). Table 1 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for the first four
studies.
Autism-spectrum quotient. The AQ questionnaire measures participants’ score on traits
associated with autism [55]. It consists of 50 items (e.g., If I try to imagine something, I find it
very easy to create a picture in my mind) and all questions were scored on a 4-point Likert scale
(‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’, and ‘definitely disagree’). This is different
from the original scale, which scores questions with 0 or 1, but the reliability was comparable
(i.e., Cronbah’s alpha [α] = .89 for the 4-point Likert scale instead of α = .86 for the bimodal
scale). For the items in which an agree-response was reflective of autistic traits the scoring was
reversed. Thus, high AQ scores as well as scores on the AQ subscales (e.g., social skills) were
indicative of autistic traits. We used the Dutch version of the AQ, which was translated accord-
ing to the backward translation procedure [56].
Data analysis. To allow comparison with the data obtained in the other countries in later
studies, we only examined three of the religiosity questions in the regression model (‘To what
extent do you consider yourself religious?’, ‘How often do you visit a church, mosque or religious
meeting?’ and ‘How often do you pray?’), reliability α = .84, although we did use all data in a net-
work analysis model which will be explained below. The average religiosity score was highly
positively skewed (1.78) and non-normally distributed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (49105) = .21,
p< .001. Therefore, religiosity was dichotomized into atheists (average score lower than 2,
59.8%) and believers (average score of 2 or higher, 40.2%). To facilitate comparisons with
other countries and because the education-scores were bimodally distributed, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (49105) = .20, p< .001, we divided participants in two groups on the basis of a
median split (34.5% low educated). To investigate the effect of traits associated with autism on
participant’s religiosity, we first conducted generalized linear models for all analyses in the
paper. Considering the highly skewed and bimodal distribution of religiosity we first tested a
Table 1. Demographical variables for Study 1 to Study 4.
N %
Female
% Low
educated
%
Atheist
Religiosity Age AQ EQ SQ EQ-SQ CREDs Geometrical Figures Video
Intentional Random Mechanical
Study 1:
The
Netherlands
65561 54.4 34.5 59.8 2.04 (1.31) 29.5
(11.1)
2.13
(0.38)
- - - - - - -
Study 2:
The
Netherlands
588 50.9 29.3 49 2.66 (1.84) 39.2
(13.1)
2.41
(0.45)
2.77
(0.55)
- - 2.27
(2.31)
- - -
Study 3:
Switzerland
603 78.9 0 27.4 2.56 (1.58) 21.4
(3.8)
2.1
(0.03)
- - - - - - -
Study 4:
The USA
797 53.3 41.8 33 3.24 (1.93) 34.6
(10.7)
2.32
(0.33)
2.94
(0.54)
2.7
(0.50)
0.24
(0.68)
3.29
(1.54)
78.5 (20.8) 38.7
(24.5)
25.6 (26.0)
Data are Means with standard deviations between brackets. AQ = Autism Quotient, EQ = Empathy Quotient, SQ = Systemizing Quotient, EQ-SQ = hyper-
empathizing, CREDs = Credibility Enhancing Displays.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t001
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mixture response with Tweedie Log Link (Ma & Jørgensen, 2007) and then divided religiosity
in a categorical and subsequently a dichotomous predictor. Because these different analyses
did not lead to meaningfully different results, we report the most parsimonious and compre-
hensible model (i.e., religiosity as a dichotomous predictor). We conducted a hierarchical
logistic regression analysis in which the dichotomized religiosity dummy was predicted by the
AQ, while controlling for demographic predictors. A hierarchical logistic regression analysis
was preferred over a simultaneous model, as some demographical predictors have previously
found to be robustly related to religiosity and had to be controlled for [57]. Therefore, in the
first step, gender, age and education[58–60] were added as predictors of religiosity using the
Enter method (for consistency with other countries, we used this same procedure for all fur-
ther regression analyses). In the next step, the AQ was included as predictor.
Results
Hierarchical logistic regression analysis. Table 2 shows the outcome of the logistic
regression analysis. Compared to the constant only model, the first model was statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that the predictors reliably distinguished between atheists and theists, χ2(3)
= 889.55, p< .001, although the relationship was weak (.01 = small, .09 = medium, .25 = large)
[61], Nagelkerke R2 = .02. Gender and age both made a significant contribution whereas edu-
cation did not. Females were 1.59 times more likely to be theist than males and with each unit
increase in age, the odds of being theist increased with 1.01. In the second model, the AQ was
added as predictor. However, the second model was not significant in comparison to the first
model, χ2(3) = 2.66, p = .103, Nagelkerke R2 = .02, indicating that religiosity could not be
meaningfully predicted by the AQ.
It could be argued that the AQ and the demographical predictors shared some variance,
and that by the order in which the predictors were added to the model (i.e., demographical
predictors first) there was less variance left for the AQ to explain. An additional analysis in
which only the AQ was added revealed that the model reliably distinguished between atheists
and theists, χ2(1) = 7.18, p = .007, although the explained variance of the model was very small,
Nagelkerke R2< .001. To be better able to compare the relative influence of the AQ and the
demographical predictors an additional analysis was conducted in which only the demograph-
ical predictors were entered. In this model, the predictors at least explained some variance,
χ2(3) = 889.55, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .02.
Network model analysis. The general idea of the supposed relationship between menta-
lizing and supernatural beliefs is that our mentalizing capacities are a necessary component to
Table 2. Logistic regression analysis for variables predicting religiosity by atheists (N = 29,348) and theists (N = 19,575) in Study 1, controlling for
background variables.
Model 1 Model 2
B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI]
Intercept -1.08 <0.01 -0.99 <0.01
Gender 0.01* <0.01 1.01 [1.01–1.02] 0.01* <0.01 1.01 [1.01–1.02]
Age 0.46* -0.02 1.59 [1.53–1.64] 0.46* 0.02 1.58 [1.53–1.64]
Education 0.03 -0.02 1.03 [0.99–1.07] 0.03 0.02 1.03 [0.99–1.07]
AQ -0.04 0.03 0.96 [0.92–1.01]
Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males, education is coded 1 for high Educated and 0 for low educated. eB = exponentiated B, B = odds ratio.
AQ = Autism Quotient.
* p < .001. R2 (Nagelkerke) = .02 for Model 1 and R2 (Nagelkerke) = .02 for Model 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t002
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be able to represent the intentions of supernatural agents. However, the religiosity questions
also tapped into general religiosity and church visit. While it may be logical that mentalizing is
related to representing or interacting with a supernatural agent, it may be less logical to sup-
pose a link between mentalizing and visiting churches or religiosity in general. Therefore, in
Fig 1 a network analysis model was added [62], showing a graphical representation of the
inter-item correlations of all items used in the study. In this way it can be directly investigated
whether specific items of the religiosity questionnaire and the AQ are interrelated. According
to a clustering algorithm, nodes (i.e., circle in the figure) are placed more closely together
when they are more strongly correlated. The threshold for an edge (i.e., line in the figure) to
appear between two nodes was a small correlation (r> .10; to increase the visibility of the lines
the threshold was not constant for all studies). As is evident from the model, none of the religi-
osity nodes is linked to any of the AQ items, suggesting that there appears to be no relationship
between religiosity and the AQ, independent of the specific items used. However, gender was
related to belief in God, reflected by the thin line from gender to belief in God (i.e., R1). Please
Fig 1. Network analysis model showing a graphical representation of the inter-item correlations
among all items used in Study 1. Gen = gender, AGE = Age, EDU = Education, REL = religiosity,
AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, R1 = God, R2 = praying, R3 = Church, R4 = religiosity, Q1 –Q50 = item 1–50
of the Autism Spectrum Quotient. The lines represent the inter-item correlations. Thicker lines represent
larger correlations and correlations are thresholded at r = .10. Green lines are indicative of positive
correlations, red lines of negative correlations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.g001
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
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not that this line is relatively thin, reflecting a small correlation (r = .10) and may not visible on
some screens.
Discussion
In a large-scale survey, we could not replicate earlier findings that the AQ was a significant pre-
dictor of religiosity [16]. The order in which the predictors were added to the model did not
have an influence on the interpretation of the results. When the AQ was entered first into the
model, none of the variance in religiosity was explained by the AQ. Furthermore, a compari-
son of a model in which only the AQ was added as predictor and a model in which all demo-
graphical predictors were added to the model indicated that the demographical predictors at
least explained some variance whereas the significant influence of the AQ was trivial due to the
size of the sample. We also showed that it is unlikely that we failed to find an effect due to the
way we operationalized religiosity, by adding a network analysis model that graphically visua-
lizes the inter-item correlations between all items used in the model. Even though the thresh-
old of the correlations to appear in the model was set at a fairly low value (a correlation of
r = .10), no correlations were observed between any of the religiosity items and any of the AQ
items. Overall, these results indicate that the relative importance of mentalizing (as assessed
with the AQ) for predicting religiosity may be limited.
Apart from cultural differences between the Netherlands and the US that will be addressed
in Studies 3 and 4, a concern may be that our sample consisted of a generally highly educated
group of people interested in (popular) science (i.e., they were readers of Dutch popular sci-
ence magazine). However, since previous samples also consisted of highly educated students
[16,17] this characteristic of our sample seems unlikely to explain any of the differences
between our and previous studies. Further, we doubt that we selectively sampled participants
scoring high on the AQ due to our recruitment method (i.e., asking participants to find out
how autistic they are) as we had a very large sample and the AQ was normally distributed with
comparable means to an earlier study using participants from the Dutch population [56].
What could be considered a limitation is that we only included the AQ as a proxy of
mentalizing, while previous studies also used the EQ or the reading the mind in the eye test
[16,17,26,63]. Due to the collaboration with the popular science magazine (i.e., Quest), it was
only possible for us to request readers to participate in one questionnaire. In Study 2, we
addressed this problem by providing readers of the magazine a voluntary option to fill out the
EQ as well. In addition, we added a questionnaire on CREDs in order to be able to compare
the relative importance of mentalizing in relation to culturally learned aspects of religiosity.
Study 2: The Netherlands 2
Introduction
In Study 2, we again investigated whether mentalizing was related to religiosity, this time by
taking into account an additional operationalization of mentalizing (i.e., the EQ). In addition,
we examined the relative importance of mentalizing in predicting religiosity as compared to
CREDs, a specific instance of cultural learning focusing on the credibility of religious actions
observed by children during their upbringing.
Materials and methods
Participants. Data were collected from the 5th of January 2015 until the 26th of February
2016 from the same website as reported in Study 1. In total, 15,530 participants filled out the
survey. All participants younger than 18 were removed from further analysis (leading to an
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
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exclusion of 3,626 participants). Further, we removed all participants who did not fill in all
questionnaires (i.e., the additional EQ and religiosity questions; 11,316 participants excluded)
and the final dataset consisted of 588 participants. Participants (50.9% female) were on average
29.5 years old (SD = 11.1; range 18–85 years), see Table 1 for all demographics.
Measures. The measures were the same as in Study 1, except for the addition of two ques-
tionnaires: The EQ and a self-constructed version of the Credibility Enhancing Displays scale
(CREDs).
Empathy quotient. The EQ questionnaire is a scale devised to measure empathy in adults
with normal intelligence. It was originally developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright [23]
and later abbreviated by Wakabayashi and colleagues [24] to a 22-item scale. All questions
were scored on a 4-point Likert scale (‘definitely agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’, and
‘definitely disagree’). Half the items were reverse coded to prevent response bias and higher
scores were indicative of higher empathy. We used the Dutch version of the EQ, which was
translated according to the backward translation procedure [64] with reliability α = .91.
Credibility Enhancing Displays Scale. At the time of this study, Lanman and Buhrmester’s
CREDs scale [22] was not yet publically available so we constructed seven questions to tap into
the concept of CREDs (e.g., ‘How often did your parents/caretakers attend religious services?).
All other questions can be found in the supplementary material (i.e., the scale had not been val-
idated in earlier Dutch studies, as we were the first to construct these items). All questions
were scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 7 = ‘to a strong extent’) with a reliability
of, α = .81.
Procedure. The participant recruitment procedure remained the same as in Study 1.
After completing the AQ on the online survey and obtaining their personal AQ score, partic-
ipants were welcomed to continue with the online survey by the following question: “We
would like to obtain more insight in the relationship between autism and individual differences
such as religiosity. We would therefore kindly like to ask you to continue with the survey”).
We do note that the way in which this question to continue the study was framed, with an
emphasis on the word ‘religiosity’ instead of all other individual differences that could have
been chosen, made it perhaps somewhat more interesting for believers to continue with the
study than non-believers. This view was supported by an analysis of variance showing that
the extent to which participants believed in God was somewhat higher for participants who
continued (M = 2.66, SD = 1.84; 1 = does not believe at all to 7 = strongly believes) than for
participants who only filled out the first part of the survey, consisting of the AQ (M = 2.10,
SD = 1.39), F(1, 9294) = 84.54, p< .001. Also, the mean religiosity score of Study 2 was
slightly higher than in Study 1 (see Table 1 for the demographics of both studies). However,
this effect was small (η2 = .01), and compared to the US samples used in previous studies
investigating this topic, our sample was still relatively atheistic, so this effect was not likely to
have influenced the results.
Data analysis. The data analysis was similar to the first study. In the first model, again the
demographical predictors were taken as these have been related to religiosity in the past. In the
second model the EQ or the AQ was added (correlational analyses showed a strong negative
correlation between the two variables, r = -.72, p< .001, suggesting that it would not be advis-
able to insert them together), as we wanted to investigate whether variables associated with
mentalizing are important for predicting supernatural beliefs. In the third model CREDs were
added to explore to what extent cultural learning adds to predicting religiosity in comparison
to mentalizing. However, neither the EQ nor the AQ made a significant contribution to the
model, so for reasons of brevity we chose to take the EQ and AQ together in the second model.
As an explorative analysis, all interaction terms were added to the model but non-significant
interactions were dropped for brevity.
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Results
Hierarchical logistic regression analysis. Table 3 shows the outcome of the logistic
regression analysis. Compared to a constant only model, the first model was statistically signif-
icant, indicating that the predictors reliably distinguished between atheists and theists, χ2(3) =
11.49, p = .009, although the relationship was weak, Nagelkerke R2 = .03. Gender and age both
made a significant contribution whereas education did not. Females were 1.55 times more
likely to be theist than males and with each unit increase in age, the odds of being theist
increased by 1.02.
In the second model, the AQ and EQ were added as predictors. However, the second model
was not significant in comparison to the first model, χ2(2) = 0.50, p = .777, Nagelkerke R2 =
.03. In the third model, CREDs as well as the interaction between CREDs and age (see data
analysis) were added as predictors, resulting in a significant contribution to the prediction,
χ2(2) = 52.65, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .14. CREDs and the interaction between CREDs and
age (centered at 18 years for ease of interpretation) were both significant predictors. For each
unit increase in CREDs, the odds of being theist increased with 1.55. With regard to the inter-
action effect, age was centered at 18 years, so a one-unit increase in CREDs at the age of 18
decreased the odds of being a theist with 0.99. This indicates that CREDs had a stronger influ-
ence on younger participants than on older participants. The demographics did not change
much: gender and age still made a significant contribution whereas Education, AQ and EQ
did not.
To disentangle the relative contribution of operationalizations of mentalizing (i.e., the
AQ and the EQ) from the relative contribution of the demographical predictors and CREDs,
we constructed three additional models. In the first model only the AQ and the EQ were
entered as predictors, resulting in a non-significant model, χ2(2) = 0.88, p = .646, Nagelkerke
R2 = .002, indicating that our operationalizations of mentalizing did not adequately distin-
guish atheists from theists. In the second model, only the demographical predictors were
entered as predictors, resulting in a significant model, χ2(3) = 11.49, p = .009, Nagelkerke
R2 = .03. In the third model, only CREDs were entered as predictor, resulting in a significant
model, χ2(2) = 47.71, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .10. Thus, a comparison of the explained
Table 3. Logistic regression analysis for variables predicting religiosity by atheists (N = 288) and theists (N = 300) in Study 2, controlling for back-
ground variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI]
Intercept -0.79 0.29 -0.42 1.17 -1.85 1.28
Gender 0.44** 0.17 1.55 [1.12–2.15] 0.43* 0.17 1.54 [1.10–2.15] 0.54** 0.18 1.71 [1.20–2.43]
Age 0.02* 0.01 1.02 [1.00–1.03] 0.02* 0.01 1.02 [1.00–1.03] 0.03** 0.01 1.03 [1.01–1.05]
Education 0.07 0.18 1.07 [0.75–1.54] 0.09 0.19 1.09 [0.76–1.57] 0.16 0.20 1.17 [0.80–1.71]
AQ -0.14 0.27 0.87 [0.51–1.47] -0.05 0.28 0.95 [0.55–1.65]
EQ -0.01 0.22 0.99 [0.64–1.53] 0.03 0.23 1.03 [0.65–1.61]
CREDs 0.41*** 0.07 1.51 [1.32–1.73]
Age18*CREDs -0.01** 0.01 0.99 [0.99–1.00]
Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males, education is coded 1 for high educated and 0 for low Educated. AQ = Autism Quotient, EQ = Empathizing
Quotient, CREDs = Credibility Enhancing Displays scale, age18 = age centered at 18 years. eB = exponentiated B, B = odds ratio.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001. R2 (Nagelkerke) < .01 for Model 1 and Model 2, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .14 for Model 3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t003
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variance of the models revealed that the relative contribution of both the demographical pre-
dictors and CREDs outweighed the relative contribution of mentalizing that seemed to be
non-existent for this sample.
Network model analysis. Finally, similarly as in Study 1, we conducted a network model
analysis to graphically represent the inter-item correlation between all items to rule out the
lack of a relationship between mentalizing and religiosity is due to the way religiosity was oper-
ationalized. The outcome of the network model analysis is represented in Fig 2 and shows that
at least some items of the AQ and EQ were related to religiosity, but that the correlations were
weak (lines between nodes were thresholded at r> .15). Crucially, the model shows that an
absence of a relationship is not likely to be the result of the artificial means with which we
Fig 2. Network analysis entailing a graphical representation of the inter-item correlations among all items used
in Study 2. GEN = Gender, AGE = Age, EDU = Education, REL = religiosity, CREDS = Credibility Enhancing Display
Scale, AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, EQ = Shortened Empathy Quotient, R1 = God, R2 = praying, R3 = Church,
R4 = religiosity, CREDS1 –CREDS 7 = item 1–7 of the own-constructed Credibility Enhancing Display Scale, Q1 –
Q50 = item 1–50 of the Autism Spectrum Quotient. The lines represent the inter-item correlations. Thicker lines
represent larger correlations and correlations were thresholded at r = .15. Green lines are indicative of positive
correlations, red lines of negative correlations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.g002
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formed the construct religiosity, but that it is rather the result of the lack of correlations
between the operationalizations of mentalizing and any of the religiosity items.
Discussion
Again, we did not find the hypothesized relationship between operationalizations of menta-
lizing (i.e., the AQ or the EQ) and belief in supernatural agents. We did find a strong effect
of our self-constructed CREDs scale when predicting religiosity, thereby adding to a growing
literature on this topic [20–22,54,65]. We acknowledge that these questions primarily tap
into visible markers of religiosity of the parents and are not necessarily equivalent to the cen-
tral idea of CREDs that ‘actions speak louder than words’ [20,21]. Nevertheless, these find-
ings indicate that i) whether parents’ beliefs are accompanied by credibility-enhancing
displays and ii) demographical predictors like age and gender, respectively, are far more
important in determining whether people believe than individual differences in mentalizing
capacities as assessed with the AQ. Nevertheless, cultural learning is a proximal factor [66]
that may explain why people believe and how religiosity spreads; proximal factors do not
explain how belief once came into existence (one of the main topics of interest of the cogni-
tive science of religion). For this reason, the fact that in multiple U.S. and Canadian samples
in another study [16], mentalizing (as assessed with people with ASD in Study 1, the AQ and
EQ in Study 2, Study 3 and Study 4, and the reading the mind in the eye test in Study 4) was
a significant predictor of religiosity, is theoretically highly interesting and relevant. Thus, it
is important to investigate whether the absence of a role of mentalizing in our studies may
be the result of cultural differences between our Dutch samples and the U.S. (and Canadian)
samples investigated previously.
An important cultural difference between the U.S. and the Netherlands is that the Nether-
lands is far more secularized than the U.S. In The Netherlands, only 10% of the believers fre-
quently attend church and The Netherlands have one of the highest percentages of atheists in
the Western World [67]. In contrast: in the U.S., 37% of the population frequently attends
church [68] and the U.S. has the lowest percentage of atheists of all countries in the Western
World [1]. Even the president engages in religious CREDs (e.g., ending each speech by say-
ing “May God bless you and may God bless the United States of America”). A possibility is that
in highly religious countries fluctuations in mentalizing capabilities (i.e., decreases) can lead
to observable effects on religiosity, whereas in highly secular countries fluctuations do not
help to explain already prevalent atheism (i.e., a floor effect). Before investigating a religious
sample from the U.S. in Study 4, in Study 3, we tried to address this issue by looking at
dataset that was available from a study in Switzerland in which all necessary variables were
included. Switzerland is a country less secularized than the Netherlands [67,69], but more
than the U.S [1].
Study 3: Switzerland
Introduction
Switzerland has a moderate to strong interwoven relationship between society and Christianity
[69]. The percentage of the population that self-reports to be atheist is almost twice as large in
The Netherlands as in Switzerland [1]. Whereas 39–44% of the people reported to be atheist in
the Netherlands, this was only true for 17–27% in Switzerland. In this study we investigated
the relationship between the AQ and religiosity in a similar fashion as in the first two Dutch
studies, although in this dataset the EQ was not taken into account.
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Materials and methods
Data were collected from first year psychology students from the 10th of October 2014 until
the 18th of December 2014 at the University of Lausanne. The investigation was part of a larger
study validating questionnaires on trait schizotypy and autistic traits [70,71]. In total, 627 par-
ticipants filled out the survey, but AQ data from one participant was missing. Participants
(78.9% female) were on average 21.4 years old (SD = 3.8; range 15 to 50 years), see Table 1 for
all demographics. The religiosity measure was different from the two studies, with minor
changes in terms of the assessed demographics. In the Swiss sample, 15 questions were mea-
sured that related to religiosity, however not all participants filled out all these questions. Par-
ticipants were first asked to answer the question whether they were believer, atheist or
agnostic. Second, participants were asked how they defined themselves religiously (i.e., Chris-
tian, Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Atheist/ not believer, agnostic/ we cannot know, other). To
be as much consistent with the first studies as possible, we used religiosity (believer vs. atheist)
as a dichotomous predictor and left the agnostic people out because agnostics can be either
believers or non-believers (leading to an exclusion of 23 participants). The other 13 religiosity
items were only filled in by believing and agnostic participants. In the first question, people
were asked how often they visited churches and in the third question participants were asked
how often they prayed (rarely or never, 1–2 times a month, more than 2 times a month). Items
4–13 were measured on a 7 point Likert scale, (1 = not at all/ not important at all, to 7 =
strongly/ very important; e.g., translated from French: ‘is it easy to represent yourself God or/and
his will?’). Further data analyses were similar to Study 1, apart from the predictor ‘education’
that was dropped because all participants were university students.
Results
Hierarchical logistic regression analysis. Table 4 shows the outcome of the logistic
regression. The first model was not statistically significant different from a constant only
model, indicating that the predictors did not reliably distinguish between atheists and theists,
χ2(2) = 0.16, p = .923, Nagelkerke R2< .01. In the second model, the AQ was added as predic-
tor. However, the second model was also not significant in comparison to the first model,
χ2(1) = 2.15, p = .143, Nagelkerke R2 = .01.
Network model analysis. Similarly as in the first studies, we conducted a network model
analysis to graphically represent the inter-item correlation between all items to rule out that
the lack of a relationship between mentalizing and religiosity is due to the way religiosity was
operationalized. The outcome of the network model analysis represented in Fig 3 shows that at
least some items of the AQ were related to religiosity, but that the correlations were weak
(lines between nodes emerged only for r> .15). There are more green lines than red lines
Table 4. Logistic regression analysis for variables predicting religiosity by atheists (N = 240) and theists (N = 168) in Study 3, controlling for back-
ground variables.
Model 1 Model 2
B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI]
Intercept 1.13 0.52 -0.04 0.95
Gender 0.01 0.22 1.01 [0.65–1.57] 0.05 0.23 1.06 [0.68–1.64]
Age -0.01 0.02 0.69 [0.95–1.04] -0.01 0.02 0.99 [0.95–1.04]
AQ 0.53 0.37 1.71 [0.83–3.50]
Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males. eB = exponentiated B, B = odds ratio. AQ = Autism Quotient. None of the models was significant. R2
(Nagelkerke) < .01 for Model 1 and R2 (Nagelkerke) = .01 for Model 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t004
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764 August 23, 2017 13 / 31
between the AQ and religiosity items, indicating that the correlations between AQ and religi-
osity items are more often positive than negative. Crucially, the model shows that an absence
of a relationship is not likely to be the result of the means by which we formed the construct
religiosity (believing yes/no), but that it is rather the result of the lack of the strength of the cor-
relations between the AQ and any of the religiosity items.
Discussion
In Study 3, we investigated the possibility that in highly religious countries fluctuations in
mentalizing capabilities (i.e., decreases) can lead to observable effects on religiosity, whereas in
highly secular countries they do not add to explain the already prevalent atheism. However, we
did not find the presumed relationship between the AQ and religiosity in a sample from a less
Fig 3. Network analysis entailing a graphical representation of the inter-item correlations among all items
used in Study 3. GEN = gender (1 = female, 2 = male), AGE = age, REL = religiosity, AQ = Autism Spectrum
Quotient, R1—R14 = religiosity items (see supplementary material online), Q1 –Q50 = item 1–50 of the Autism
Spectrum Quotient (see supplementary material online). The lines represent the inter-item correlations, thicker lines
represent larger correlations and correlation lines start from r = .15. Green lines are indicative of positive correlations,
red lines of negative correlations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.g003
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secularized country than the Netherlands. The percentage of atheists was lower in the Swiss
sample than both Dutch samples. Thus, it is unlikely that we failed to observe an inverse rela-
tionship between religiosity and the AQ in The Netherlands due to the high secularity in this
country. Moreover, in the network analysis model all measured religiosity items were taken
into account and the AQ items were more often positively related with religiosity rather than
negatively.
Two differences between the Dutch and the Swiss sample are important to note. First, the
Swiss sample was more highly educated than both of the Dutch samples as all Swiss partici-
pants were university students. On the one hand, it may seem remarkable that the percentage
of theists was higher although analytic thinking [72] as well as intelligence [73] have repeatedly
been related to disbelief. On the other hand, the effects of analytic thinking and intelligence
were weak and the previous studies from the current paper as well as other studies [16,72]
have shown that education may not be a robust predictor when it comes to explaining religios-
ity when factors as gender and age are being controlled for.
Second, the percentage of females was considerably higher in the Swiss sample than in the
Dutch samples, a factor that could also explain the higher percentage of theists in the Swiss
sample since the experiments above and previous studies have shown that females more
strongly believe than males [16,58,72]. Further, females score lower on the AQ than males
[55], possibly diminishing the potential influence of individual differences in the AQ on pre-
dicting religiosity. Speaking against this, however, is the finding that the AQ score was some-
what higher in the Swiss sample than in the Dutch samples, probably due to the fact that the
Swiss sample consisted of only high-educated participants and highly educated people score
higher on the AQ than lower educated participants [55]. Nevertheless, while Switzerland may
be less secularized than The Netherlands, there are still large differences between Europe and
the United States, as the United States is one of the most religious countries of the Western
World [1]. Thus, there may be cultural differences between the United States and Europe that
may explain why a relationship between mentalizing and religiosity is more present in the
USA than in Europe. To address this issue we conducted a direct replication of the study of
Norenzayan et al. [16] by recruiting a group of participants from the US. We pre-registered
this study on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/6vrne/).
Study 4: United States of America
Introduction
In Study 4, we conducted a replication of the study of [16] by using a sample from the U.S. as
well as using the exact materials as provided by of one of the co-authors of that study (i.e., Will
Gervais). This means that we used the same material as in Study 2 and added the systemizing
quotient (SQ) and several religiosity items. The SQ measures the drive to analyze or construct
systems. This scale was not related to religiosity in the study of Norenzayan et al. [16]. It has
been suggested, however, that not mentalizing, but hyper-empathizing is predictive of religios-
ity [25]. The underlying idea is that humans have two parallel cognitive systems, one for
mentalizing (i.e., interaction with the psychological environment) and one for systemizing
(interaction with the physical environment)[74,75]. Specifically the combination of high
empathizing (good mentalizing capacities) and low systemizing (poor understanding of how
the physical world works) may encourage supernatural beliefs. Thus, adding the SQ allowed us
to more directly replicate the study of Norenzayan et al. (16) as well as to test the hypothesis
that hyper-empathizing predicts religiosity as has been suggested and found in earlier studies
[63].
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Furthermore, we wanted to tap into the concept of mentalizing ability differently by using
an experimental measure of mentalizing ability (i.e., not relying on self-report questions with
validity problems that have been outlined in the introduction). Therefore, we added the geo-
metrical figures task (GFT). In this task, participants watch geometrical figures move as if they
have goal directed intentions (i.e., the figures chase each other). In line with the proposed the-
ory that mentalizing deficiencies decrease religiosity, we predicted that decreased intentional-
ity ratings on the videos would be associated with decreased religiosity.
Materials and methods
Participants. Data were collected from the 4th of November 2015 until the 16th of January
2016 on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in which we aimed to test approximately 250 atheists, 250
spiritual and 250 Christian believers to obtain sufficient variability in religiosity for another
study. In total, 1.235 participants started the survey, and of which 797 participants (53.3%
female) completed it (64.5% completion rate; M age = 34.6, SD = 10.7, range 18 to 70). Partici-
pants received $2.50 for participation.
Measures and procedure. On the website of Amazon Mechanical Turk, participants were
offered the opportunity to conduct an online survey. The first question required participants
to indicate the kind of belief system they endorsed (“non-believer/atheist, Christian, Muslim,
Hindu, Spiritual believer, or another belief system”). If participants reported not to consider
themself an atheist, Christian or spiritual believer, they were directed to the end of the survey.
To prevent people from participating twice, people could not participate with the same IP-
address more than one time. The following questionnaires were obtained in respective order:
demographics (age, gender, social economical status, years of education), religiosity (although
we used the exact same questions as used in Norenzayan et al. [16] we only analyzed the ques-
tions that were also obtained in Study 1 and Study 2 to ease comparison between countries),
α = .89, CREDs (as measured with Lanman and Burhmester, [22] scale), α = .92, AQ, α = .86,
EQ, α = .83, the systemizing quotient (SQ), α = .88 and the Geometrical Figures Task.
Systemizing quotient. The SQ measures the drive to analyze or construct systems. It was
first developed by Baron-Cohen [76], later abbreviated by Wakabayashi et al. [24] and consists
of 25 items on which participants could either agree or disagree (e.g., “I am fascinated by how
machines work” and “I find it difficult to read and understand maps”), some of which were
reverse-scored. Higher scores were indicative of higher self-reported systemizing skills, α =
.83.
Credibility enhancing displays. As explained above, CREDs are signals (i.e., displays) of
actions that increase or decrease the likelihood of believing in the existence of the supernatural
[21]. We here used Lanman and Buhmester’s validated CREDs scale [22]; e.g., Overall, to what
extent did your caregiver(s) act as good religious role models?”). All questions were scored on a
7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’ to 7 = ‘to a strong extent’) with reliability α = .92.
Geometrical figures task. We used an adapted version of the Geometrical Figures Task
developed by Riekki, Lindeman and Raij [51] in which animations displayed moving geomet-
rical figures. Participants had to rate to what extent movements performed by the geometrical
figures were intentional by adjusting a scale from 1 (no intentionality present) to 100 (strong
intentionality present). Participants were first shown three practice videos, one of each category
(i.e., intentionality, mechanically and random). Each practice video was accompanied by an
instruction explaining why the video was intentional or non-intentional (mechanic or ran-
dom). For the intentional movements video it was explained that the figures moved as if they
had an intention, for example as if one figure chased the other. For the mechanical video, it
was explained that the figures moved as if following the laws of physics. So, if one figure
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touched another the other figure would also start moving or if the figure touched the wall it
would bounce back. The random movements were semi-random as the animations were pro-
grammed in such a way that figures would not touch each other, otherwise figures would
appear to run through each other. Participants were instructed that these figures moved ran-
domly and that there was no logical mechanical or intentional pattern observable in the move-
ments of the figures.
The stimuli of Riekki et al. [51] were developed for a functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing study and therefore quite easy to rate in terms of intentionality and randomness. In order
to increase the difficulty (and ambiguity) we cut the original videos of 30 seconds in 3 parts of
10 seconds. In addition, we increased the speed of the videos by changing the length to 6 sec-
onds per video. In total, we used 24 clips, 8 of each video type (i.e., intentional, random and
mechanical motion). Each participant rated only a pseudo-randomized subset of 9 videos (3
from each video type).
Data analysis. The logistic analyses were similar to the previous studies: religiosity was
non-normally distributed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (787) = .09, p< .001. Therefore, religiosity
was dichotomized into atheists (average score lower than 2, 33%) and theists (average score of
2 or higher, 67%). In the first model the demographical variables were taken as predictors. In
the second model all operationalizations of mentalizing were added: the AQ, EQ-SQ and the
GFT. In the final model, CREDs were added. As an explorative analysis, all interaction terms
were added to the model but non-significant interactions were dropped for conciseness.
Results
Hierarchical logistic regression. Compared to a constant only model, the first model was
statistically significant, indicating that the predictors reliably distinguished between atheists
and theists, χ2(3) = 35.17, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .06 (see Table 5 for the outcomes of the
logistic regression analysis). Gender and age both made a significant contribution whereas
education did not. For females, the odds were 1.78 times more likely to be theist than for males
and with each unit increase in age, the odds of being theist increased with 1.03. In the second
model, all operationalizations relating to mentalizing (i.e., the AQ, EQ-SQ and the GFT) were
added as predictors to the model and they significantly contributed to the model, χ2(5) =
33.40, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .12. Seeing intentionality in random videos as well as mecha-
nistic videos made a significant contribution to the model, whereas the AQ, hyper-systemizing,
and seeing intentionality on intentional videos did not. With each unit increase on the random
video as well as on the mechanistic video (scale = 1–100), the odds were 1.01 times more likely
to be theist than atheist. The other predictors did not change much in comparison to the first
two models: gender and age still made a significant contribution.
In the third model, CREDs were added resulting in a significant contribution, χ2(1) =
47.91, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .19. With each unit increase on the CREDs scale (1 to 7) the
odds of being theist increased with 1.46. The other predictors did not change much in compar-
ison to the first models: gender, age and the random and mechanical videos still made a signifi-
cant contribution whereas education, the AQ and hyper-systemizing did not.
To disentangle the relative contribution of operationalizations of mentalizing (i.e., the AQ,
SQ-EQ and the GFT) from the relative contribution of the demographical predictors and
CREDs, we constructed three additional models. In the first model the AQ, EQ and GFT were
entered as predictors, resulting in a significant model, χ2(3) = 14.08, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 =
.03, indicating that our operationalizations of mentalizing did distinguish atheists from theists.
In the second model, only the demographical predictors were added, resulting in a significant
model, χ2(3) = 35.17, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .06. In the third model, only CREDs were
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764 August 23, 2017 17 / 31
entered as predictor, resulting in a significant model, χ2(1) = 60.60, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 =
.10. Thus, a comparison of the explained variance of the models revealed that the relative con-
tribution of both the demographical predictors and CREDs outweighed the relative contribu-
tion of our operationalizations of mentalizing.
Finally, similar to the previous studies we conducted a network model analysis to graphi-
cally represent the inter-item correlation between all items. The outcome of the network
model analysis is represented in Fig 4 and shows that several items of the AQ and EQ were
related to the religiosity items (lines between nodes were thresholded at r> .15). Essentially,
the model shows that there are multiple correlations between the AQ, EQ and SQ items on the
one hand and religiosity items on the other hand. Importantly, most of these relationships are
negative and thus in line with the notion that reduced ToM capacities are linked to reduced
belief in supernatural agents.
Explorative analysis: Curvilinear relation between AQ and religiosity. A still open-
standing possibility is that the relationship between the AQ and belief in supernatural agents
might better be captured by a curvilinear relationship than by a linear relationship, perhaps
explaining the lack of the fit of the AQ in the previous models. The underlying idea is that for
people with high scores on the AQ it may be problematic to represent supernatural agents or
read the intentions of supernatural agents, whereas for people scoring low to moderate on the
AQ, no relationship would be expected (resulting in a random distribution). To investigate
this possibility a logistic regression model was conducted similar to the first model of Study 4,
except for the fact that the quadratic term was added to account for a possible curvilinear effect
[77]. In order to do so, the AQ was centered (i.e., AQ-centered) and added to the model and
the quadratic term of the centered predictor (i.e., AQ2-centered) was also added to the model.
The outcomes of the first model are identical to the first model of Study 4. In the second
model all operationalizations relating to mentalizing (i.e., the AQ-centered, AQ2-centered,
EQ-SQ and the GFT) were added as predictors to the model and they significantly contributed
to the model, χ2(6) = 50.87, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .14 (see Table 6). The quadratic term of
Table 5. Logistic regression analysis for variables predicting religiosity by atheists (N = 263) and theists (N = 524) in Study 4, controlling for back-
ground variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI]
Intercept -0.67 0.29 -1.24 0.52 -2.19 0.56
Gender 0.58*** 0.17 1.78 [1.31–2.43] 0.50** 0.17 1.64 [1.17–2.30] 0.52** 0.18 1.68 [1.19–2.37]
Age 0.03*** 0.01 1.03 [1.02–1.05] 0.04*** 0.01 1.04 [1.02–1.06] 0.03*** 0.01 1.03 [1.02–1.05]
Education 0.10 0.18 1.11 [0.81–1.51] 0.02 0.16 1.02 [0.74–1.40] 0.06 0.17 1.07 [0.77–1.48]
AQ -0.21 0.29 0.81 [0.46–1.43] -0.06 0.36 0.95 [0.53–1.70]
EQ-SQ 0.26* 0.15 1.30 [0.97–1.75] 0.29 0.18 1.33 [0.98–1.81]
Intentional 0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99–1.01] 0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99–1.01]
Random 0.01* 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.01] 0.01* 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.02]
Mechanistic 0.01** 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.02] 0.01** 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.02]
CREDs 0.38*** 0.06 1.46 [1.30–1.63]
Gender is coded 1 for Females and 0 for Males, education is coded 1 for High Educated and 0 for Low Educated. AQ = Autism Quotient, EQ = Empathizing
Quotient, EQ-SQ = hyper-systemizing, intentional, random, and mechanistic are the different intentionality ratings for the geometrical figures videos,
CREDs = Credibility Enhancing Displays scale. eB = exponentiated B, B = odds ratio.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001. R2 (Nagelkerke) = .06 for Model 1, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .07 for Model 2, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .12 for Model 3 and R2 (Nagelkerke) = .19 for Model 4.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t005
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the AQ as well as attributing intentionality to both the random and mechanistic videos all sig-
nificantly added to the model. For each unit increase on the quadratic term of the centered
AQ, the odds were 6.99 (i.e., 1/0.143) more likely to be theist than atheist. For each unit
increase on the random and mechanical video, the odds of being theist increased with 1.01.
The other predictors did not change much in comparison to the first model: gender and age
still made a significant contribution.
In the third model, CREDs were added to the model resulting in a significant contribution,
χ2(1) = 45.69, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .22. With each unit increase on the CREDs scale (1 to
7) the odds of being theist increased with 1.45. The other predictors did not change much in
comparison to the first models: gender, age, the quadratic term of the centered AQ and the
Fig 4. Network analysis entailing a graphical representation of the inter-item correlations among all items
used in Study 4. GEN = gender (1 = female, 2 = male), AGE = age, EDU = education, REL = religiosity,
CRE = CREDs (i.e., Credibility Enhancing Displays scale), AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient, EQ = Empathy
Quotient, SQ = Systemizing Quotient, INT = intentionality rating for the intentionally moving geometrical figures,
RAN = intentionality rating for the random moving geometrical figures, MEC = intentionality rating for the
mechanically moving geometrical figures, R1—R14 = religiosity items (see supplementary material online), Q1 –
Q50 = item 1–50 of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (see supplementary material online). The lines represent the
inter-item correlations, thicker lines represent larger correlations and correlation lines start from r = .15. Green lines
are indicative of positive correlations, red lines of negative correlations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.g004
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random and mechanical videos still made a significant contribution whereas education, the
centered AQ and hyper-systemizing did not.
To be able to disentangle the relative contribution of all operationalizations of mentalizing
(i.e., the AQ-centered, AQ2-centered, SQ-EQ and the GFT) from the relative contribution of
the demographical predictors and CREDs, we constructed two additional models. In the first
model only the operationalizations of mentalizing were entered as predictors, resulting in a
significant model, χ2(6) = 44.04, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .08, indicating that our operationa-
lizations of mentalizing distinguished atheists from theists. In the second model only the qua-
dratic term of the centered AQ was entered as predictor, resulting in a significant model, χ2(1)
= 14.59, p< .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .03, again indicating that the quadratic term of the centered
AQ distinguished atheists from theists. Above, we already showed that the explained variance
of the demographical predictors was Nagelkerke R2 = .06, whereas the explained variance of
the CREDs was Nagelkerke R2 = .10. This indicates that in the US sample the operationaliza-
tions of mentalizing were somewhat less important than CREDs, but comparable to the demo-
graphical predictors gender and age.
Discussion
In the fourth study, we could explain 19–22% of the variance in religiosity by means of just
two demographical variables (i.e., gender and age) and two constructs (i.e., all mentalizing
operationalizations and CREDs). The findings of the studies above were partially replicated:
CREDs, age and gender significantly predicted religiosity, whereas the AQ and hyper-system-
izing did not. Extending the studies above, we observed that attributing intentionality to
mechanical or random videos did account for some of the variance in religiosity.
Explorative analyses revealed that it may be the case that specifically high scores on the AQ
are linked to decreased belief in supernatural agents, whereas no such relationship was present
for lower scores (i.e., an inverted hockey stick shape). We ruled out that this was the result of
Table 6. Explorative logistic regression analysis for variables predicting religiosity by atheists (N = 263) and theists (N = 524) in Study 4, control-
ling for background variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI] B SE B eB [95% CI]
Intercept -0.67 0.29 -1.14 0.53 -2.06 0.56
Gender 0.58*** 0.17 1.78 [1.31–2.43] 0.58*** 0.18 1.78 [1.26–2.51] 0.60*** 0.18 1.82 [1.23–2.59]
Age 0.03*** 0.01 1.03 [1.02–1.05] 0.04*** 0.01 1.04 [1.03–1.06] 0.04*** 0.01 1.04 [1.02–1.05]
Education 0.10 0.18 1.11 [0.81–1.51] -0.03 0.16 0.98 [0.71–1.35] 0.03 0.17 1.03 [0.74–1.43]
AQ-centered -0.16 0.29 0.85 [0.48–1.51] -0.02 0.30 0.99 [0.55–1.77]
AQ2-centered -1.95*** 0.49 0.14 [0.06–0.37] -1.88*** 0.51 0.15 [0.06–1.41]
EQ-SQ 0.24 0.15 1.27 [0.94–1.71] 0.26 0.16 1.30 [0.96–1.77]
Intentional 0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99–1.01] 0.00 0.01 1.00 [0.99–1.01]
Random 0.01* 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.01] 0.01* 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.01]
Mechanistic 0.01** 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.02] 0.01** 0.00 1.01 [1.00–1.02]
CREDs 0.37*** 0.06 1.45 [1.30–1.62]
Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males, education is coded 1 for high educated and 0 for low educated. AQ-centered = centered Autism Quotient,
AQ2-centered = quadratic term of the centered Autism Quotient, EQ-SQ = hyper-systemizing, intentional, random, and mechanistic are the different
intentionality ratings for the geometrical figures videos, CREDs = Credibility Enhancing Displays scale. eB = exponentiated B, B = odds ratio.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001. R2 (Nagelkerke) = .06 for Model 1, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .07 for Model 2, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .12 for Model 3 and R2 (Nagelkerke) = .19 for Model 4.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t006
Mentalizing, CREDs and supernatural beliefs
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764 August 23, 2017 20 / 31
adding a quadratic term in general: for none of the other predictors we found a significant con-
tribution when the centered quadratic term was added, even not for the CREDs. Following
these outcomes, we also fitted curvilinear models on all other studies (i.e., Study 1–study 3),
but this did not result in similar findings; the quadratic term was not related to religiosity in
the Dutch or Swiss sample. Thus, this relation may be considered a false positive, or there is
a cultural difference explaining why we observed a curvilinear relationship between the
AQ and religiosity in the U.S. but not in the other countries (e.g., due to a floor-effect of religi-
osity in some countries, the association between mentalizing and religiosity does not become
apparent).
Attributing intentionality to random and mechanistic videos significantly contributed to
predicting religiosity. Thus, when participants reported to perceive more intentionality in
moving geometrical figures in which intentionality was absent, they also more strongly
endorsed religious beliefs. Similar findings were obtained by van Elk [78] and Riekki et al.
[51], who observed that paranormal believers attributed more intentionality to random mov-
ing geometrical figures than skeptics. The findings that over-attribution of intentionality is
predictive of supernatural beliefs is in line with the idea of a hyperactive agency detection [4]
or intentionality ‘device’ [79]. According to these ideas, over-attribution of agency (i.e., seeing
intentionality where it is objectively not present) encourages people to belief in supernatural
intentionality. Considering that the data are correlational, it could also be the case that people
who have been raised religiously and learned to perceive intentionality (e.g., God’s will) in
coincidental events are more sensitive to perceive intentionality in ambiguous situations.
The videos were added to be able to tap more directly into mentalizing abilities than the
self-report measures (EQ, SQ and AQ) used in earlier studies [16,17,25], but perceiving inten-
tionality in the videos was not related to the questionnaires. For scales that are used for their
indirect association with the ability to mentalize, the absence of a relationship with a task that
is used to localize mentalizing in the brain seems at least undesirable. On the one hand, these
findings may add to comments of other researchers who have questioned the validity of using
the EQ as operationalization of mentalizing capacities [17,27,80]. On the other hand, these
findings may just suggest that operationalizations of somewhat different constructs were used.
Whereas the AQ and EQ may tap into the self-reflected mentalizing ability of people, the out-
comes on the GFT may be rather a reflection of implicit mentalizing abilities, or the result of
deliberate systemizing skills (see the introduction and discussion of Study 4).
With regards to hyper-empathizing, our findings deviate from earlier suggestions of Baron-
Cohen et al. [75] and observations of Lindeman et al. [25] who suggested that rather than high
systemizing or low mentalizing alone, the specific combination of high mentalizing and weak
systemizing skills may encourage religiosity. Our findings add to this literature by showing
that if anything, the relative contribution of this cognitive bias in the way we operationalized is
small when compared to the relative importance of demographical variables like gender and
age or cultural learning factors such as CREDs. However, other researchers [81–83] have
pointed out that the empathizing/systemizing dichotomy insufficiently captures the two paral-
lel modes of cognition that humans have evolved (i.e., mentalistic cognition and mechanistic
cognition). Especially systemizing is criticized for being a too narrow construct, as it is
restricted to understanding the behavior of systems, whereas mechanistic cognition incorpo-
rates this as well as it basically extends to the entire physical world. Thus, future research
should try to better capture these modes of cognition, to investigate its relationship to super-
natural beliefs.
Further, the network analysis showed that for the US sample far more items of the AQ were
related to religious beliefs than for the first three studies. This indicates that in general, the cor-
relations between religiosity and the AQ items were somewhat higher than in the Netherlands
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and Switzerland. This suggests that the differences may be the result of cultural differences.
One problem of the previous studies in the current paper is that all the operationalizations of
mentalizing used have limitations, making it unclear to what extent the construct mentalizing
was captured. Therefore, in the final study a group of people with ASD (i.e., a group with men-
talizing deficiencies) was compared to a group of people without ASD (see the introduction
for a discussion of previous studies on this topic).
Study 5: The Netherlands 3
Introduction
Similar to Study 1 of Norenzayan et al. [16], we investigated whether people with mentalizing
problems (i.e., people with an ASD diagnosis) are less inclined to endorse supernatural beliefs.
To investigate this, we compared adolescents with an ASD diagnosis to adolescents without
such a diagnosis in terms of their religiosity, religious behaviors and CREDs. Religious behav-
iors (e.g., praying, ritualized behaviors) were also taken into account because we speculated
that the way in which people with ASD engage in religiosity might still be high but rather dif-
ferent (i.e., with a focus on ritualized behavior instead of beliefs). For example, Swanson [39]
proposed that children may be able to come to know God via ritual (i.e., behavioural) practices
in religion. CREDs were taken into account to rule out that any between group differences in
religiosity were the result of stronger religious upbringing. On the basis of the curvilinear rela-
tionship observed in the U.S. sample (i.e., Study 4) we predicted that a group of people with
ASD would have significantly lower supernatural beliefs than people without an ASD diagno-
sis. Further, we speculated that if people with ASD would engage in religiosity, then this would
be rather reflected primarily in religious behaviors rather than religious beliefs. Finally, we pre-
dicted that autistic people would overall attribute less intentionality to videos of the GFT, but
that this would be especially evident in the videos in which intentionality was present.
Materials and methods
Participants. Data were collected from two nearby high schools (2 kilometers in distance)
in the center of Rotterdam. One high school (Heer Bokel College) was specialized in educating
adolescents with ASD, the other was a regular high school (Wolfert van Borselen) but we
recruited adolescents from the same educational level (i.e., HAVO: The Dutch equivalent of
the senior general secondary education). We recruited 34 participants at the high school for
adolescents with ASD but one did not have an official ASD diagnosis and was dropped from
further analyses (for the descriptive statistics of both groups, see Table 1). Specifically, 8 adoles-
cents were diagnosed with classical ASD, 13 with Asperger’s syndrome, 15 with pervasive
developmental disorder—not otherwise specified, 1 with multiple-complex developmental
disorder, 2 with a social communication disorder and of 4 we could not obtain the specific
diagnosis. In addition, these disorders were sometimes accompanied by attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (16.2%) or attention deficit disorder (13.2%). We recruited 30 control
participants but one participant had an ASD diagnosis and was dropped from further analyses
(we did not add this participant to the ASD group as we reasoned that the severeness of ASD
may have been weaker considering that the participant went to a general high school). Signifi-
cantly more males were recruited in the group with ASD (28) than in the control group (17),
χ2(1) = 5.34, p = .021, Cramer’s V = 0.29, which is in accordance with previous literature
[55,84], but the groups did not differ in age (range 13–18 years, ASD group M = 14.6, SD = 1.4;
NO ASD group = 14.5, SD = 1.3), Welch’s t (59.8) = 0.27, p = .787, d = 0.07. Participants
received confectionery and fruit for participating in the survey. The adolescents as well as the
parents signed informed consent and the Ethical Committee of the University of Amsterdam
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approved the study. With regard to the ‘capacity’ of people with ASD to provide consent, it is
important to note that all participants were high-functioning individuals on a high educational
level.
Measures. We used the same materials as in the earlier studies: the AQ (α = .84), GFT
(intentional, random and mechanic videos; reliabilities are not available as not all videos were
seen by all participants), religiosity (α = .84) and CREDs (α = .74). In addition, a self-con-
structed and unvalidated religious behavior scale was added consisting of 4 items (i.e., How
often do you engage in the following religious activities: praying, meditation, religious ceremonies,
ritualized behaviors) on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = never, 7 = very often). The reliability was
accurate, α = .86.
Procedure. Participants had to report their demographical variables and filled in the reli-
giosity questionnaires and the CREDs scale. Subsequently, participants were instructed about
the GFT (see Study 4 for a detailed description of this task). They were shown three practice
videos; one of each category (i.e., intentional, random and mechanical). In total, we used 24
clips, 8 of each video type (i.e., intentional, random and mechanical motion). Each participant
rated only a pseudo-randomized subset of 15 videos (5 from each video type). Finally, partici-
pants filled in the AQ.
Data analysis. To investigate whether adolescents with ASD differed from adolescents
without ASD on the AQ, religiosity, religious behaviors, CREDs and the GFT videos (i.e.,
intentional, mechanical and random) we conducted a series of independent samples Welch’s
t-tests and all significance levels were set at .05 (i.e., two-tailed).
Results
As expected, adolescents with ASD diagnoses scored higher on the AQ than adolescents with-
out such a diagnosis, Welch’s t (60) = 2.89, p = .005, d = .73 (see Table 7 for M’s and SD’s).
With regards to the religiosity measures, in contrast to our expectations the groups did not dif-
fer on religiosity, t(59.8) = 0.23, p = .819, d = 0.06, religious behaviors, t(57.2) = 0.21, p = .836,
d = 0.05, or CREDs, t(59.5) = 0.96, p = .340, d = 0.24. With regards to the GFT videos, we
found that adolescents with ASD ascribed less intentionality towards random, t(59.1) = 2.14,
p = .036, d = 0.55 and mechanical videos, t(51.0) = 2.79, p = .007, d = 0.72, than adolescents
without ADS, but no difference was observed for the intentional videos, t(56.8) = 1.12, p =
.266, d = 0.29, while we specifically expected a reduction for people with ASD for this latter
category.
Discussion
In Study 5, we observed that adolescents with ASD did not differ from adolescents without
ASD on religiosity, religious behaviors, CREDs or intentional videos, but did differ on random
and mechanical videos in the sense that they attributed less intentionality towards these latter
videos. Following suggestions of Swanson [39] we hypothesized that religiosity in autistic peo-
ple may perhaps be somewhat more oriented towards religious behavior (i.e., in the form of
ritualized behaviors), but we found no support for this idea. With regards to the absence of a
difference on the religiosity measures, our study deviates from the findings of Caldwell-Harris
et al. [33] and Norenzayan et al. [16] who did observe differences between people with and
without ASD. Our findings were comparable to those of Reddish et al. [36] who observed only
very few differences between the people with and without ASD on seven measures of religious
beliefs and behaviors. These findings indicate that at least in the Netherlands, mentalizing defi-
ciencies were not associated with disbelief. Further, we observed that adolescents with ASD
attributed less intentionality to mechanical and random videos. This is in line with the idea
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that people with autism are better in systemizing [24,55]. Interestingly, adolescents with ASD
did not seem to have difficulties with attributing intentionality to intentional movements.
However, as pointed out in the discussion of Study 4 as well, it is possible that participants
with ASD conducted the task using a systematic strategy (i.e., maximizing the contrast in rat-
ings between videos from different categories). Thus, for future studies, it may be practical to
establish what type of intentionality people with ASD perceive in the videos in a more qualita-
tive approach, instead of working with a scale from 1 to 100.
General discussion
In four large sample studies from three countries and a small sample study involving people
with ASD we found mixed evidence for a relationship between mentalizing and religiosity.
Importantly, we could not replicate the finding that the AQ was predictive of religiosity in any
of the studies. Only when fitting a curvilinear model we observed that high scores on the AQ
were related to decreased levels of religious belief, but only in the US sample. In addition, cor-
relations between religiosity and all other variables were higher in the US than in the other
samples. Further, we directly compared different measures of mentalizing (i.e., the AQ, EQ,
EQ-SQ and GFT) with demographical characteristics (i.e., gender, age and education) and cul-
tural learning variables (i.e., CREDs). We found that mentalizing and hyper-systemizing only
made a small contribution to predicting religious beliefs in the US, whereas gender, age and
CREDs made robust contributions in the Netherlands and the US. Furthermore, in a Dutch
sample we found no differences in terms of the strength of religious beliefs between people
with and without strong mentalizing deficiencies. In short, the current studies highlight the
importance of culture for determining religious beliefs in two respects. First, when explaining
supernatural beliefs, the influence of cultural learning seems more important than individual
characteristics such as gender, age and mentalizing. Second, even if mentalizing explains any-
thing about supernatural beliefs, it could be that this is only the case in countries where believ-
ing is normative.
Table 7. Descriptive characteristics of the variables used in Study 5.
Group N M SD SE
AQ** ASD 33 2.24 0.35 0.06
No ASD 29 2.00 0.31 0.06
Religiosity ASD 33 2.31 1.75 0.31
No ASD 29 2.22 1.45 0.27
Religious Behaviours ASD 33 1.94 1.25 0.22
No ASD 29 2.01 1.37 0.25
CREDs ASD 33 2.42 1.42 0.25
No ASD 29 2.10 1.13 0.21
Intentional ASD 33 78.53 16.24 2.83
No ASD 29 73.59 18.10 3.36
Random* ASD 33 27.40 22.94 3.99
No ASD 29 39.86 22.77 4.23
Mechanical* ASD 33 15.53 18.23 3.17
No ASD 29 31.09 24.71 4.59
* p < .05,
** p < .005, ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, No ASD = adolescents without Autism Spectrum Disorder, AQ = Autism Quotient, CREDs = Credibility
Enhancing Displays Scale, Intentional, Random and Mechanical refer to the Geometrical Figures Task videos.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182764.t007
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Overall, the current findings add to recent work in which authors questioned whether men-
talizing was related to religious beliefs [25,26,36,85]. Although we did find a curvilinear effect,
we only observed this for the AQ, not for any other of the operationalizations of mentalizing
(i.e., the EQ, GFT or EQ-SQ). One intriguing possibility would be to analyze previously pub-
lished data [16,25,26,33,36] using curvilinear models on the AQ, to see whether it this theoreti-
cal suggestion can be replicated in other samples as well. However, the findings that people
with ASD did not differ from people without ASD [36] in a US sample makes a strong case
against the idea that only strong mentalizing deficiencies are inversely related to supernatural
beliefs in countries where religiosity is normative.
In Study 5, we conducted a similar study and we observed that when comparing adolescents
with and without ASD, we did not find any difference in terms of the level of religiosity. These
findings coincide with anecdotal reports that showed that people with ASD are in fact capable
of believing in supernatural agents [8,35,37–39] and our findings are in accordance with the
findings of other researchers investigating the level of religiosity in people with ASD [34–36].
Our observations contrast to the findings of two previous investigations involving the religios-
ity of people with ASD. However, it is important to note that these findings were based on a
small sample (N = 12 vs. N = 13; [16]) or were obtained by comparing forums of websites [33],
which may not have resulted in representative samples.
Interestingly, our findings on the GFT in Study 4 showed that people with ASD were as
capable as people without ASD in attributing intentionality to geometrical figures, but did
attribute less intentionality to random and mechanical videos. This is somewhat in line with
the findings of Gray et al., [34] who observed that people with ASD were better able to interact
with nonhuman animals and robots than humans. According to the authors reading the inten-
tions of these agents does not require deconstruction of complex social behaviors. A similar
suggestion could be made regarding the reading the intentions of supernatural agents; in some
cases, these might even be easier to understand (e.g., the 10 commands Mozes received from
God), than the intentions of human agents [34]. Nevertheless, ASD is a very heterogeneous
disorder so that generalizations should be made with caution [30].
Further, we observed in Study 4 that people without ASD who attributed more intentional-
ity towards random and mechanical moving geometrical figures endorsed stronger religious
beliefs. We hypothesized that attributing intentionality towards random and mechanical mov-
ing figures would require the activation of the ToM-network. If this is the case, these findings
are in support of the idea that over-attribution of mentalizing capacities may underlie super-
natural beliefs (e.g., 16). Alternatively, the data are in line with the theoretical idea that onto-
logical confusions may underlie supernatural beliefs [25,63]. That is to say, people seem to
have confused the distinctive attributes of mental, physical, living and animate phenomena
(i.e., applying mental states to non-animate phenomena).
At least four limitations of the present studies are worth mentioning. First, our study
may exaggerate the distinction between mentalizing skills and CREDs. Specifically, children
likely need mentalizing skills in order to understand and represent the beliefs of their
parents. Thus, there may be a strong interaction between mentalizing skills and CREDs
that we could not capture by means of our regression analyses. Children that reason in a
more mechanistic fashion may have a more difficult time to present their beliefs [86]. It is
hard to disentangle mentalizing and mechanistic cognition from CREDs as they are an
inherent part of the process whereby CREDs are acquired. A possible way of disentangling
these concepts better is by means of a longitudinal study in which researchers follow
children with more dominant mentalistic or mechanistic cognition and investigate how
CREDs interact with these types of cognition. Relatedly, it would be interesting to study
children or twins to investigate the heritability component of CREDs. There may be a
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common genetic factor that underlies both sensitivity to learning and practicing CREDs,
which could partly explain the heritability component of religiosity and the observed effect
of CREDs on religiosity.
Second, a shortcoming of the studies is that it is unclear to what extent we truly captured
the construct mentalizing or other related processes (e.g., empathy, social skills etc.). Future
research should focus on better tools to capture individual differences in mentalizing capaci-
ties. The effects of mentalizing on religiosity seem minor in the way we operationalized it, but
it may still be worthwhile to further explore the effects of mentalizing in future research. For
example, schizophrenic hallucinations and delusions are often characterized by magical and
religious phenomena. It has been argued that this may be the result of too dominant mentalis-
tic cognition and hyper-mentalizing [86].”
Third, we used different religiosity questions for all of the countries. To keep the ques-
tions as consistent as possible we operationalized religiosity by means of the questions that
were comparable over the three countries (i.e., the questions related to belief in God, praying
and church visit). However, these three questions may not have necessarily been the best
ways to address the question of interest: Does an evolved cognitive mechanism for inferring
intentionality (i.e., mentalizing) underlie the capacity of inferring the intentionality of super-
natural agents? It could be argued that our measures of religiosity encompassed both intrin-
sic and extrinsic indicators of religiosity, whereas primarily intrinsic measures of religiosity
may be related to mentalizing. To address this potential problem, we added network analysis
models in all of the studies (except for Study 5 considering the small sample) and incorpo-
rated all questions that were related to religious beliefs, so that we could investigate whether
some religiosity questions were stronger related to mentalizing than others. Also, we could
investigate which AQ items specifically would underlie this relationship. However, only in
the US sample some weak correlations were observed between the religiosity items and the
AQ and EQ. This again supports the idea that there were cultural differences between the US
and the European countries and future studies may address why exactly the relationship
between operationalizations of mentalizing and religiosity seems stronger in one country
than the other.
Fourth, in this study we compared CREDs with demographical factors and cognitive biases
and it could be argued that this comparison between proximal and ultimate factors [66] in
determining religious beliefs actually answers different questions. Proximal factors such as
CREDs answer the question why people believe in supernatural agents nowadays. It is obvious
that how your parents raised you is a strong determinant of one’s personal worldview and reli-
gious beliefs [12,52]. Distal factors (e.g., cognitive biases as often discussed in the cognitive sci-
ence of religion literature) could explain how supernatural beliefs once came into existence.
How is it that at so many places on earth people independently started to believe in supernatu-
ral agents [87]? CREDs can help answer how, once one member of a tribe had supernatural
beliefs, these beliefs were able to go ‘viral’ (i.e., quickly spread from one member of a tribe to
another). However, CREDs cannot answer how this specific member started believing in
supernatural agents for the first time. In that sense, it may be an unfair comparison to compare
factors that are important to belief nowadays with factors that are nowadays no longer impor-
tant but may have originated thousands of years ago. Nevertheless, as outlined in the introduc-
tion, the influence of mentalizing is often discussed in the literature (the current paper
included) as if it distinguishes believers from non-believers nowadays [16,17,33]. So ultimately,
the current studies show that nowadays there is a strong importance of cultural learning in the
form of CREDs, and that variations in mentalizing are unlikely to discriminate believers from
non-believers.
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